Keymer Ávila
24 de abril de 2024
Last month saw the launch of the third report of the Monitor of Use of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean, a work of six universities and six research centers in nine countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. Since the founding of this space in 2018, the Monitor of Use of Lethal Force in Venezuela (MUFLVEN) has taken on the responsibility of preparing the Venezuela chapter of the report, from its line of research developed for several years at Universidad Central de Venezuela. Below are the main findings of this new research effort.
As it has become usual in these reports, the Venezuelan case exceeds most of the thresholds for abuse of lethal force and appears as one of the most alarming in the region. Unfortunately, the situation has not improved from an economic, political or social point of view, nor concerning the abuses of lethal force by the State. This is our first report without official data on the main indicators under study, which in itself constitutes a sign of the current state of affairs.
Since 2020, the government has carried out a fragmented and informal economic liberalization, reducing public spending and increasing social inequalities. Politically, these economic reforms have been paired with the consolidation of authoritarianism that has imposed a negative pacification in the country. This is the general context that frames the different factors that have influenced a circumstantial decrease in both the number of homicides in the country and the deaths attributable to the intervention of public forces in recent years. Even with this decrease in the number of cases, the figures have not reached pre-2014 levels, which were already very high and far above the countries in the region.
Regarding the decrease in the number of cases, a group of initial hypotheses offers the opportunity for further reflection.
In the framework of negative peace imposed in the country in recent years, a series of factors have influenced the circumstantial decrease in deaths due to intervention by public security forces during the period in review. Some of the most important are:
- The decline in social and economic activities and, consequently, the opportunities for violent street crime;
- the pandemic, the quarantine measures and the militarization of the country;
- the reduction of the population by at least 20% as a consequence of the Venezuelan exodus, with young men (the main active and passive subjects of violence) accounting for a good part of the migrant population;
- domestic politics marked by the need to portray a situation of normalcy and stability to “create” favorable electoral climates;
- the open denunciation by the Attorney General of the Republic of the abuses committed by the FAES in specific cases that have affected the interests of the ruling coalition;
- Denunciation and pressure at international instances against the government for human rights violations in the country, and other factors under further analysis that can be consulted in the Venezuela chapter of the report.
Despite the decrease in cases, their number remains very high both in comparison to the record for the country in the last decade and when regional contrasts are made, which reveals that the figures continue to be alarming.
In this sense, it is worth noting how the indicators of incidence of use of lethal force -those related to the size of the population, number of agents and risk they face- have generally decreased during the period in review, while the indicators of abuse of lethal force have surged. This means that the absolute number of cases during the period is lower, but abuse and lethality have increased. The violation of the principle of necessity may have decreased a little in some cases but the violation of the principles of moderation and proportionality has remained constant or even increased. This shows the analytical utility of the indicators built and validated for this regional Monitor. The number of cases is not the only or the main indicator.
Thus, for example, in seven years of analysis, the number of deaths due to the intervention of public security forces as a percentage of all homicides reached their peak in 2020 and 2021, at 25% and 21% respectively. That a quarter of the homicides in a country are committed by agents of the State is already a clear indication of abuse of force, something that has not been observed in any other country. Not to mention that these cases are usually underreported and that official figures from previous periods have shown a much more serious reality, with rates that reach a third of all homicides (33.3%).
2022 became an emblematic year because it recorded the lowest number of cases, and yet it shows one of the highest lethality indexes (58.4 civilians killed for each civilian wounded) and lethality ratios (25.4) ever recorded. These indicators should not be higher than 1; if they exceed that threshold, the index would suggest excessive use of force, and the lethality of the public security forces could no longer be explained by the risks faced by the agents. In both cases, the index is well above the threshold of 1.
The exceptional events that have occurred in this period, such as the clashes with irregular groups on the border (2021) and with criminal gangs (2021 and 2022), led to an increase in the number of civilians and agents wounded, agents killed and detentions, in comparison to previous periods. Paradoxically, they did not give rise to a decrease in lethality rates but rather the opposite. These indicators corroborate a form of governance of the national executive that has consolidated during this period, exercising unlimited force and power.
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Read the full report HERE
Watch the presentation of the report HERE
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Originally published in: Efecto Cocuyo
English version originally published in: Hearts on Venezuela
Translated by José Rafael Medina
Originally published in Hearts on Venezuela
