September 28, 2016
Keymer Ávila | @Keymer_Avila
A more complete version of the work on security force officials who were victims of homicide was recently published . It suggests some ideas that dismantle much of the media rhetoric around this topic, which distorts and makes it difficult to understand. This research tries above all to offer certain information for political-institutional decision-making that increases both the safety of officials and the general public.
Among the findings of this work is the profile of the perpetrators of deceased officials. In only 51.8% of the cases was information found regarding the profession or trade of the perpetrators. Within these, the following occupations can be distinguished, ordered from highest to lowest percentage: 1) Officials of State security forces (31%) ; 2) workers, masons, craftsmen and painters (24%); 3) students (14.8%); 4) sellers or storekeepers (10.4%) and drug micro-traffickers (10.4%); 5) Robbers, homeless people and motorcycle taxi drivers (3.4% each).
What is most striking ‒and at the same time worrying‒ about these results is that 31% of the cases are perpetuated by officials of the State security forces against their own colleagues. This, in part, may be due to the fact that in these cases the victimizing officials are much more visible compared to those in other trades. Let’s see their profiles below.
Of these 31% of the cases, 44.4% were in the exercise of their duties, were in uniform and identified as officers; the other 22.2% were not, and 33.33% did not provide information on these aspects.
33.3% of the victimizing officials belonged to the army ; 33.3% to the GNP , while the CICPC, the municipal police and the escorts each represented 11%. 77.8% of the victimizing officials belonged to the lowest operational levels of their respective careers. The non-representation of the state police is due to the fact that the cases analyzed were limited to the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, where the PNB is deployed.which possibly brings as a consequence that the only state police in this area does not have a presence in these 4 municipalities to dedicate itself to the remaining 17 municipalities of its State. So then, these results cannot serve as an excuse for not giving visibility to the state police in this type of deviations.
It should be noted that this is not a new phenomenon. Already Rosa Del Olmo (1990) in a pioneering work described that in the mid-1980s, approximately 20.2% of officials killed in Caracas were victimized by other officials.
Finally, it is considered necessary to mention the micro-traffickers and robbers who, contrary to what common sense and popular and institutional prejudices say, do not occupy the first places among the occupations of the perpetrators, although it should be noted that in the files (which were our object of study) there is not only institutional information, but also testimonials that may be loaded with particular interests and prejudices that affect these results, these are data that should not be overestimated but not underestimated either. It was also interesting that “students” ranked third on the scale. In contrast to the official discourse, neither foreigners nor paramilitaries appeared among the perpetrators .
The unfortunate case of the seven PNB allegedly involved in the murder of a chief supervisor of Polimaracaibo serves to address this issue again. If this happens to the officials themselves, what can the general public expect ?
You can read the full investigation here: http://revistas.urosario.edu.co/index.php/desafios/article/view/5051/3446
Publicado originalmente en Provea